Barely two and a half years after the last ones, new Lower House elections will take place in the Netherlands on 22 November 2023. Although for many this still seems far away, political parties are working hard to be ready for the campaign and election day. This is happening against the backdrop of a significant exodus of politicians from The Hague, and a political arena that is thus becoming more and more open. Many political protagonists of recent years are leaving, and new faces are emerging. What will the coming months until the elections look like, and what are important milestones for public affairs professionals to keep a sharp eye on?

 

Vacancies and ‘musical chairs’ in politics in The Hague

The fall of cabinet Rutte IV has been accompanied by a big exodus from political The Hague. A growing list of influential party leaders, cabinet members and MPs will not return, including prime minister of over 13 years Mark Rutte (VVD – Conservative Liberals), Wopke Hoekstra and Pieter Heerma (CDA – Christian Democrats), Sigrid Kaag (D66 – Liberal Democrats), Carola Schouten and Piet Adema (CU – Christian Union). Uncertain but potentially influential is the future of MP Pieter Omtzigt. The most recent poll by I&O research showed that his possible participation in the elections has a lot of impact on the expected outcomes.

As a result, several parties are undergoing a game of musical chairs, with Dilan Yesilgöz coming forward as a potential successor to Rutte for the VVD, and Rob Jetten standing as a candidate for the D66 list leadership. At the CDA, Mona Keijzer, Hugo de Jonge, Marnix van Rij and Hanke Bruins Slot have thanked for the list leadership. In addition, the latter two indicated that they do not need another term in The Hague at all. On the left flank, PvdA (Labour) and GroenLinks (Greens) announced early this week a joint list and programme, and current EU Commissioner Frans Timmermans will return from Brussels to be nominated as list leader.

 

Election process and planning

Election programme committees, and selection committees, have been put together by most parties over the past two weeks. Each party uses its own timeline, participation procedure and agenda.

Often, election programme committees consist of a mix between parliamentary group staff, MPs, staff from scientific bureaus and prominent party members. Because the last elections were held not so long ago, many committees use the ‘old’ election programme 2021 – 2025 as a blueprint. It therefore pays off to connect any input to it: concrete and specific recommendations are more important than ever because the proposals are already somewhat coloured in. At the same time, much has happened on several policy dossiers since 2021, making adjustment or readjustment of positions inevitable. Think of the nitrogen crisis, aviation industry, or European tech legislation. Draft programmes will be published from early to late September, after which party members can amend it. Each party has its own procedure and rules for this, which can vary greatly.

Then the new party leaders. In several parties, the current list leader remains in place, but in parties such as VVD, D66, CDA and Pvda/GroenLinks, a new face is being sought. Many party boards have now nominated individuals; all nominations will be known by the end of August. It is then up to the party to vote in the list leader.

Finally, candidate lists are being constituted. This process also varies from party to party – for some, much of it will remain the same while parties like BBB (Farmers Rights Party) and VOLT (Pan-European Party) are busy recruiting new faces.

After the summer recess, party congresses then take place, where the list leader, election programme and candidate list are voted upon. Final election programmes and electoral lists are then published in October. The elections themselves take place on 22 November, usually the electoral recess starts about three weeks before – although the exact date is not yet known.

 

Policies: controversial or not?

Which policy files do MPs want to continue to discuss, and which not? There are no formal rules to determine in advance which papers are considered ‘controversial’. The Lower House prepares this in procedural meetings per committee in the first week after the recess. July and August are used by political groups and MPs to find majorities to declare dossiers controversial or not, and of course many companies, organisations, NGOs and other interest groups make themselves heard in this process. The Upper House can also declare documents controversial. A committee majority may respect the wishes of a committee minority to deem a particular item controversial. After all extra procedural meetings, the plenary Clerk’s Office draws up a list of all controversial items. Political groups can submit proposals to amend this list, after which the House votes on it on 12 September.

New topics can also be later declared as controversial by committees. Conversely, a committee can still decide to pursue a previously declared controversial topic by sending a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and voting on that letter in the House.

After a new cabinet takes office, the House first holds a debate on the government statement. The new cabinet then sends an official communication to the House of Representatives on the proposals of the previous cabinet that are retained or withdrawn. After that, all items previously declared as controversial can be put back on the agenda for a procedural meeting, at which further discussion is decided.

 

National Budget debate?

An uncertain but important element in the coming months is the process of national budget negotiations. On Tuesday 19 September, the caretaker government will present the State Budget and Budget Memorandum for 2024 on ‘Prinsjesdag’ (budget day). From October to the end of November, the House of Representatives has scheduled written and plenary sessions to discuss each ministerial budget.

However, this schedule is thrown into disarray by the elections, and the election recess (normally 3 weeks) that precedes it. With the regular autumn recess (13 – 23 October), there seems to be little time left for the budget debates, even though they have to be approved in December. Moreover, it is difficult to anticipate the content of the national budget: controversial topics are not yet clear, and the caretaker government will present a policy-poor budget at all so as not to get in the way of a new cabinet. It is expected to become clear shortly after the recess what path the House Presidium has in mind for this.

Outlook

The upcoming elections look set to mark a major shift in Dutch politics. The upcoming campaign, elections and coalition negotiations will be filled by many ‘new’ faces, while parties have only a few months to prepare. Moreover, initial polls show significant trends, such as strong growth for BBB and significant losses for CDA and D66. The joint list of PvdA and GroenLinks led by Timmermans also seems likely to be succesfull.

All these elements contribute to a hectic election period, during which it can be difficult to distinguish main and secondary issues. Public Matters naturally keeps a close eye on the situation. If you would like to know more about how we can support you in this regard, please feel free to contact us.

A new era is dawning in the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, with Sweden wrapping up its term and passing the baton to Spain on July 1st. As the last “full” presidency before the parliamentary elections slated for June 2024, Spain’s focus will mainly be on concluding numerous pressing legislative proposals. The political landscape is challenging, considering Spain’s recent regional elections that led to early national elections set for July 23rd. Amidst this climate of change and uncertainty, questions arise concerning Spain’s ability to effectively preside, especially in the event of an extended coalition formation or a shift in the existing coalition. Despite these hurdles, Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, a social democrat, is resolved to tackle several significant crises by the end of the year. These include the European migration pact, debt rules for member states, sanction packages for Russia, and the EU’s dependence on third countries. This blog by our colleagues Judith and Valérie delves into the key priorities and challenges the Spanish presidency may face, particularly in the Energy, Tech, and Healthcare sectors.

A fresh trio of presidencies: Spain, Belgium, and Hungary

Spain, Belgium, and Hungary form the new trio at the helm of the EU Council. Each of these nations brings its unique challenges and priorities. Spain deals with the fallout of recent internal elections, Belgium prepares for the European parliamentary elections, and Hungary grapples with contentious political issues and escalating tensions with the EU.

In this dynamic and occasionally unstable climate, the role of the EU Council Presidency is paramount in ensuring stability, continuity, and progress. This trio is tasked with the responsibility of navigating their respective countries’ complex political landscapes while concurrently championing the wider interests and priorities of the EU.

Presidency priorities: open strategic autonomy

Prime Minister Sánchez underscored the importance of open strategic autonomy during the Spanish program presentation. This term, prevalent in European discussions since Macron’s appointment two years ago, posits that while the EU’s open international stance has many benefits, it has also led to dependency on third countries. Sánchez asserted that this open attitude can only be efficacious if strategic autonomy is reinforced.

Under Spain’s stewardship, this reinforcement takes the form of four key priorities: further industrialization of Europe, fostering Europe’s ecological transition, strengthening the social pillar for greater social and economic justice, and enhancing European unity. These priorities will guide the Spaniards’ efforts and also impact the dossiers discussed below.

Energy

Spain, during its EU presidency this year, will grapple with two critical energy concerns. First, the Decarbonized Gas Package, targeted transitioning from fossil fuels to more sustainable alternatives. The package sets ambitious goals, such as the increase in the production and import of green fuels to consume 20 million tons of hydrogen by 2030. To meet the climate targets for 2030 and 2050, it is crucial to expedite the establishment of a coherent EU legal framework. This will stimulate investments in a European hydrogen infrastructure network and encourage the use of green hydrogen. The strategic importance of this package is underscored by the American Net Zero Industry Act, which invests billions in green energy.

Spain will also focus on restructuring the electricity market, a response to the recent energy crisis that severely impacted Europe. In March, the Commission proposed a targeted revision of the wholesale electricity market design, a landmark move for countries favoring interventionism, including Spain. However, the proposals for “decoupling” electricity and gas prices faced stiff opposition from liberal EU economies such as Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. As Spain prepares for a tense election period during its EU Presidency, it remains to be seen how it will navigate this intricate context. Diplomats are split on whether Spain can maintain neutrality regarding the Union’s Electricity Market Design, given its historical emphasis on market reforms.

The situation is further complicated by the upcoming early elections in July. These elections could cause distractions and potentially pave the way for the conservative opposition party, Partido Popular (PP), to ascend to power. If the PP takes office, it may adopt a less interventionist policy approach. Despite these hurdles, Spain is committed to successfully concluding the regulation it initially championed.

Both issues, the gas package and the reform of the electricity market, stand a high chance of progressing under the Spanish presidency. There is wide consensus on the necessity to lessen dependency on fossil fuels and bolster the resilience and stability of the European energy market.

Tech

In the twilight of its presidency, Sweden swiftly concluded the trilogues on the Data Act and the digital ID legislation (eIDAS). In the next six months, Spain will primarily concentrate on two heavily debated laws. First, the Artificial Intelligence Act, for which trilogue discussions are expected to start post-summer. Belgium recently expressed their expectation that Spain will complete these negotiations before the end of 2023. Considering the rapid advancements in the AI field, many European politicians deem this act vital, even though numerous topics remain to be negotiated. The second challenging law pertains to the Regulation to Combat and Prevent Child Sexual Abuse Material. This proposal outlines how online platforms can detect and report online child pornography material. The debates in Parliament and the Council revolve around striking a balance between the importance of internet users’ privacy and the creation of the safest possible online environment. Spain’s mission is to achieve a “general orientation” on this matter.

The same debate is also ongoing in the stalled trilogue negotiations on the ePrivacy Regulation. The EU has been trying to revise this regulation for several years. While Sweden did not tackle this dossier, it is uncertain whether Spain will rise to the challenge or pass it on to the next Commission as a “failed” dossier.

Healthcare

Spain’s main focus in the healthcare sector will be the recently presented revision of European pharmaceutical regulations. Negotiations on this matter have just begun, and considering the dossier’s complexity and political sensitivity, it will demand significant attention from the presidency. The translations of the documents into the official EU languages are expected by September, after which the European Parliament can begin deliberations. Additionally, the Spanish government will concentrate on other healthcare issues of growing importance due to their societal urgency, such as improving the approach to rare diseases.

Conclusion

The Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union arrives at a pivotal moment for both Spain and the EU. As the final presidency with a full term before the parliamentary elections, Spain aims to conclude several dossiers. The extent to which Spain’s national elections could lead to a change in the country’s political trajectory remains uncertain. Although the presidency is expected to remain neutral, this could certainly influence the prioritization of dossiers. Furthermore, a final term provides opportunities to advance dossiers nearing completion and identify prospects for the next mandate regarding dossiers that may not reach the finish line.

Although days go by when many do not think about COVID, yesterday the two-minute debate “Developments around the coronavirus / pandemic preparedness” took place in the House of Representatives, following the May 10 committee debate. In this blog, a brief look at what the House is currently focusing on in the political discussion on COVID.

The double title of the debate already gave an insight into how the House is currently approaching coronavirus policy: it makes sense to link developments around coronavirus to pandemic preparedness. From a short-term crisis approach to long-term policy. Is this also what we see reflected in the content of the coronavirus debates? The House discussed roughly four topics:

1. The consequences of post-COVID/long covid.

Most MPs yesterday voiced concerns about long-term health issues that some people are left with from infection. Much is still unclear about this. Pieter Omtzigt requested that a widely supported definition of post-COVID be developed in consultation with patients, doctors and nurses. It was also a matter of providing perspective: how do we compensate care workers who suffer from post-COVID symptoms incurred while doing their job? Who exactly is entitled to compensation and how high should the amount be? Labour (PvdA), Greens (GroenLinks) and Socialists (SP) jointly submitted several motions about this. Also, several parties submitted motions to improve the investigation and treatment of post-Covid.

2. The analysis of the crisis approach

The House of Representatives is eager to learn lessons from the crisis approach during the coronavirus outbreak. This is not only about improving pandemic preparedness, but also about truth-telling. Based on what information were what decisions made at the time? The Ministry of Health says it cannot cope with the large number of Woo requests for information – much to the irritation of some MPs. Yesterday the House also debated the critical second partial report of the Dutch Safety Board on the corona crisis. How does the cabinet look back on harmful side effects of some measures such as school closures and curfews? All this ahead of the pending parliamentary inquiry that the House expects to establish the committee for before summer. And with the start of hearings presumably years away.

3. Pandemic preparedness

When “pandemic preparedness” is mentioned in the House, it is often about healthcare capacity. It is also about, for example, availability of medicines and resources at the time of a health crisis. Also discussed is the strengthening of public health, the Municipal Health Services (GGD’en). Is there sufficient structural funding for this? In yesterday’s two-minute debate, MP Judith Tielen (VVD – Conservative Liberals) also looked at pandemic preparedness for other viruses. Indeed, surveillance of sewage water came up in the committee debate. To what extent are there other signaling possibilities? In this context, the minister referred to the role played by the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) looking broadly at diseases with pandemic potential.

4. The coronavirus remains among us

Meanwhile, we are currently dealing with a virus that puts tens of people in the hospital every week and it is unknown how it will develop in the fall. Except for a motion by Nico Drost (CU – Christian Party) – which asks the government to carry out much more actively the current advice to stay at home in case of symptoms in order to prevent COVID infection – it was noticeable that MPs are currently not much concerned with how people (and especially risk groups) can be better protected in the short term. It seems that there is currently a sense of adequate safety and protection. Of course, the RIVM (monitoring) and the Health Council (independent Dutch advisory body) are not sitting still in the meantime. Before summer, the Health Council will issue an opinion on whether a vaccination campaign is needed in the fall, for which groups and with which vaccine.

In conclusion

With the changed epidemiological situation, it is clear that the focus in debates on coronavirus has evolved from short-term thinking to long-term planning. The topics mainly covered are: post-COVID management, crisis management analysis and pandemic preparedness. In terms of coronavirus information, what is in store for us in the short term? Before summer, the House will receive the plans regarding the structural investment in GGDs; in summer the Health Council’s advice on the Vaccination Strategy for the medium term will follow; in the meantime, the Ministry of Health is working on embedding the corona vaccine in the regular vaccination program; after the summer, the policy response to the Council of Public Health & Society (RVS) report ‘On our health – the need for a stronger public health care system’ will be shared; and in the third quarter a letter about the vaccination program for adults will follow. The House will want to ask questions – how will all these plans alone land in the already tight national budget? For now, it is safe to say that the House will not be done with the coronavirus and pandemic preparedness.

Last month, it became clear that Minister Bruins Slot of the Ministry of the Interior will not establish a lobbying register for government officials, despite the widely supported desire and multiple motions from the House of Representatives. This decision drew significant criticism during her debate with the House last month. Additionally, in recent years, the Netherlands has received various international reprimands regarding its integrity policies, such as from the European corruption watchdog, GRECO, which will conduct a new evaluation round this year.

The debate on lobbying regulation is part of a broader discussion: the integrity of public administration has increasingly gained prominence on the political agenda in recent years. In this blog, we will explore why this is the case, the developments so far, and what we can expect in the near future.

 

Integrity policy in the Netherlands falls short

Data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) indicates that public trust in the House of Representatives, politicians, and civil servants has declined in recent years. Society and politics have expressed a need for better integrity policies in public administration as a means to increase trust.

In 2019, GRECO, the Council of Europe’s corruption watchdog, assessed the Dutch integrity system as significantly inadequate. Among the eight countries examined, no country received a failing grade on all seven points, except the Netherlands. The country scored worse than countries like Poland, Malta, and North Macedonia. Two years later, GRECO concluded that little progress had been made on this issue. As a result, the government introduced new integrity policies for former government officials at the end of 2021, including more extensive rules regarding lobbying, a “revolving door” prohibition, and a mandatory cooling-off period. Despite criticism from Members of Parliament and civil society organizations, including Transparency International, these proposals marked a turning point in the ongoing discussion.

Furthermore, in late 2022, Minister Bruins Slot published a new code of conduct for government officials, which includes rules regarding secondary activities, gifts, and future roles. She also introduced annual integrity training and discussions for cabinet members and established a confidential advisor for individual advice on integrity issues. By the end of 2022, the Minister of the Interior submitted a progress report on all the measures taken to GRECO in the context of the upcoming evaluation round scheduled for this year.

 

Behavior over rules?

However, due to legal grounds, a supervision and enforcement mechanism for the code of conduct has yet to be established, much to the dissatisfaction of the House of Representatives. According to the Minister, it is not solely about rules but rather about behavior. She emphasized this point in a note sent to the House of Representatives last month. The note emphasizes the importance of robust and clear integrity rules as an “indispensable foundation for public administration.” The Minister aims to provide clarification, refinement, and better alignment of the numerous rules, which are currently documented in manuals, codes of conduct, and statutory regulations.

The Minister also stated that a lobbying register would not be introduced since clear definition of a “lobbyist” would be very difficult to establish. Based on scientific advice received, the Minister argued that implementing a lobbying register similar to the Irish model would be undesirable due to the difficulties in defining a “lobbyist.” A too specific definition could create barriers for (organized) citizens to access the government, while a limited definition could encourage anticipatory behavior that keeps certain contacts outside of the books.

 

Emotional debate

On May 9, the House of Representatives debated the government’s vision and developments regarding integrity. Emotions ran high during the debate, with Members of Parliament being highly critical, especially of the decision not to introduce a lobbying register. The Minister had previously received a clear instruction from the House, supported by coalition parties D66, CDA, and ChristenUnie, through the widely supported motion Dassen: introduce a lobbying register, preferably based on the Irish model. Members of Parliament were not satisfied with the explanation that defining a “lobbyist” is challenging. MP Pieter Omtzigt expressed his frustration during the debate and even offered to translate a definition himself for the government.

During the debate, the Minister did emphasize her commitment to the ‘spirit of the motion’ by increasing transparency regarding the contacts and agendas of government officials. The Minister has promised to provide an update on the progress of these measures to the House in early 2024. However, this led to further misunderstanding among Members of Parliament. They argued that having a lobbying register does not exclude the existence of public agendas.

Furthermore, last week, the House of Representatives voted against a motion from Renske Leijten (SP) that advocated for introducing a cooling-off period not only for government officials but also for Members of Parliament themselves. This motion could have been an interesting addition to the current policies since the House has shown little willingness to regulate itself in this area. After all, shouldn’t the principle of “equal treatment” apply here as well?

 

Looking ahead

Despite the discussions in the House, the Netherlands has taken several steps in the past year regarding integrity policies. Based on the progress information, GRECO will prepare another compliance report expected to be released on June 10. Additionally, due to the intense debates in the recent committee meeting, the Minister has pledged to send an additional letter to the House before the summer, providing further clarification on three key issues: 1) the decision whether or not to introduce a supervision or enforcement mechanism, 2) the decision not to implement a lobbying register based on the Irish model, and 3) how the Minister intends to address the widely supported motion regarding the lobbying register.

Clear and enforceable integrity rules are essential to increase public trust in public administration. It is important that this discussion continues, and the government takes steps forward. However, the debate on this matter is far from settled: the House of Representatives, as well as civil society organizations and the general public, are not yet convinced. For Public Matters, this is an important discussion that we closely follow. As a preliminary conclusion, it is encouraging to see meaningful discussions on this topic, but there is room for improvement in all aspects.

Today, members of the Provincial Council will elect the new Senate. With the resounding victory of the Farmer–Citizen Movement “BoerBurgerBeweging” (BBB) in the Provincial Council elections on 15 March, it is certain that the BBB will become the largest party in the Senate.

Since 15 March, it has already become clear on several fronts that this victory has implications for national politics. Among others, Eurocommissioner Frans Timmermans and Prime Minister Mark Rutte visited BBB leader Caroline van der Plas. Nitrogen policy seems to be one of the main topics directly affected by BBB’s victory. This must be a foretaste of what is in store for Rutte, as he cannot ignore Van der Plas and her BBB on other issues as well. Incidentally, Rutte has dealt with this axe before, so far he has always managed to make creative use of changing majorities.

With still only 1 seat in the House of Representatives, the BBB will soon dominate the Senate. As of today, the BBB is expected to have 17 of the 75 seats in the Senate. Still far from a majority, but by far the largest party in the Senate and only 5 seats less than the entire coalition put together.

This is – also for Rutte – a new situation though, as if he wants to bypass the BBB, he will have to gather at least 14 seats from other parties besides his own coalition parties to convince a majority in the Senate of the cabinet’s plans. In this case, this means GroenLinks (Greens) and PvdA (Labour), which, under Paul Rosenmöller’s leadership, appear to have 15 seats together. Or a non-obvious combination of several small parties could also bring in enough seats together.

Of course, this is a real political challenge and then it can be easier to have only one party to commit to your plans, especially if that party has only one seat in the House of Representatives. No, despite all his flexibility, Rutte cannot ignore Caroline van der Plas. And since Van der Plas cannot do it all alone, it is good to see who will soon be in the Senate on behalf of the BBB. The first 17 BBB candidates for the Senate include a former VVD MP in place 3, while the list leader was also a VVD member for many years. They bring their knowledge and experience with them, which is not necessarily an advantage for Rutte. It also gives the BBB quite a bit of blocking power.

Policy influencers, therefore, bet on the Senate and especially on BBB Senators in the coming period. Because even if the Rutte IV cabinet falls this summer, the Senate will still be in this new composition for four years.